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In recent decades, many studies have shown that schizophrenia is associated with severe
social cognitive impairments affecting key components, such as the recognition of emo-
tions, theory of mind, attributional style, and metacognition. Most studies investigated each
construct separately, precluding analysis of the interactive and immersive nature of real-life
situation. Specialized batteries of tests are under investigation to assess social cognition,
which is thought now as a link between neurocognitive disorders and impaired functioning.
However, this link accounts for a limited part of the variance of real-life functioning. To fill
this gap, advances in virtual reality and affective computing have made it possible to carry
out experimental investigations of naturalistic social cognition, in controlled conditions,
with good reproducibility. This approach is illustrated with the description of a new para-
digm based on an original virtual card game in which subjects interpret emotional displays
from a female virtual agent, and decipher her helping intentions. Independent variables
concerning emotional expression in terms of valence and intensity were manipulated. We
show how several useful dependant variables, ranging from classic experimental psychol-
ogy data to metacognition or subjective experiences records, may be extracted from a
single experiment. Methodological issues about the immersion into a simulated intersub-
jective situation are considered.The example of this new flexible experimental setting, with
regards to the many constructs recognized in social neurosciences, constitutes a rationale
for focusing on this potential intermediate link between standardized tests and real-life
functioning, and also for using it as an innovative media for cognitive remediation.
Keywords: virtual agents, schizophrenia, social cognition, theory of mind, facial expression
INTRODUCTION
There is a long history of reductionism in cognitive science, with
the progressive dissection of models of mental processes to explain
human behavior. The models are tested with experimental para-
digms that exclude confounding factors and focus only on the
constructs of interest. This approach has demonstrated the impair-
ment of several cognitive functions in patients suffering from
schizophrenia: cognitive disorders affecting attention, memory,
and executive functions are among the most commonly reported
in patients with this pathological condition (Evans et al., 1997; Cir-
illo and Seidman, 2003). There have also been clinically relevant
attempts to present schizophrenia from the standpoint of a social
cognitive disorder (Brüne, 2005; Penn et al., 2008). This point
of views generated extensive experimental research and, impor-
tantly, influenced clinical thinking in several psychiatric centers
and modeled new means of psychological treatments. Neverthe-
less, many elements are still missing to support a social cognitive
theory of psychiatric disorders, and, as we will discuss in the
following, methodological advances are hoped for to meet this
challenge.
In the first part of this article, we will give a quick overview
of the impaired processes, which were identified, from the most
elementary, such as social perception, emotional perception, and
motor resonance to the most complex, such as mentalizing and
empathizing. One practical consequence of this view of schiz-
ophrenia has been the continual development of batteries of
neuropsychological tests targeting non-social and social aspects
of cognition, for use by mental healthcare professionals [for a
review see Pinkham et al. (2013)]. These assessments, based on the
separate measurements of neuropsychological dimensions, have
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proved relevant for the prediction of functional outcome (Fett
et al., 2011), although they leave unexplained a significant part of
the variance.
In the second part of this work, we advocate the added value of
considering“naturalistic” social cognition as a domain occulted by
the classical approach. We will describe how virtual reality settings
may prove useful for investigating social interaction, especially
through the use of virtual agents. We will discuss the relation-
ships between social cognitive constructs and those arising from
researches on immersion phenomena.
In the third part, we will illustrate these ideas with the proposal
of a new paradigm based on a virtual affective agent and show
how it may be used with patients. We will argue that such exper-
imental settings will prove useful for assessing the intermediate
link between cognition and real-life functioning and give some
direction to improve the subjective experience and motivation.
PART I
EXAMINATION OF IMPAIRMENTS OF SOCIAL COGNITION IN
SCHIZOPHRENIA BY A REDUCTIONIST APPROACH
Social cognition can be considered as an entangled set of infor-
mation processes relating to the perception of others, the rep-
resentation of oneself, and interpersonal knowledge in a given
social context (Beer and Ochsner, 2006), which allows an indi-
vidual to adapt his/her behavior to the social environment. Dis-
orders of social behavior are prominent in schizophrenia as
noted by Brüne: “the most outstanding characteristic of schiz-
ophrenia is the inapt, often bizarre behavior of affected indi-
viduals (. . .) It is almost always the deviant social behavior
in schizophrenia that renders patients ‘abnormal”’ (2005, p.
135). For those social cognitive disorders may account for these
deviances, Penn and coworkers suggested that several primary
domains [theory of mind (ToM), perception of emotion in
facial expressions, attributional style] or features (i.e., metacog-
nition) should be considered when assessing social cognition
in schizophrenia. Each domain relates to some specific con-
structs, which have been the object of thorough theorization and
experiments.
First, the ability to take the mental states (intentions, beliefs,
etc.) of other people into account was extensively studied by
developmental psychologists since 1990s (Astington and Gop-
nik, 1991). ToM has been defined as the ability to represent
human mental states and to make inferences about other peo-
ple’s intentions, beliefs and desires, by acknowledging that oth-
ers may have a mental state different from our own. ToM has
been explored with verbal tasks based on stories (Corcoran and
Frith, 2003; Janssen et al., 2003; Van der Cruyssen et al., 2009)
and with non-verbal tasks involving sequences of pictures (Sar-
fati et al., 1999; Brunet et al., 2003; Langdon et al., 2006; Vistoli
et al., 2011) or a mixture of stories and pictures [for a review,
see Bazin et al. (2007) and Brüne (2005)]. Various factors may
modulate the ToM performances of schizophrenia patients and
one important debate for designing cognitive remediation tech-
niques concerns the automatic or controlled nature of these
cognitive skills (Cohen and German, 2010). For instance, ver-
bal instructions may contribute to the controlled component
of ToM (Back and Apperly, 2010), an important finding given
the widespread use of verbal instructions to remediate social
skill deficits.
Second, it is also widely accepted that patients with schizo-
phrenia and or social developmental disorders (autism, Asperger’s
syndrome) display poor discrimination of face identity, emotion,
and age (Chambon and Baudouin, 2009). The impairment of emo-
tion recognition in these patients is well documented and has
been the object of a number of reviews (Edwards et al., 2002;
Kohler et al., 2010). One of the principal difficulties observed
relates to fear (Edwards et al., 2001) and disgust (Kohler et al.,
2003). According to Kohler et al. (2003), neutral or non-emotional
expressions may be wrongly interpreted as emotional cues with a
negative bias. An intriguing result was reported by Davis and Gib-
son (2000) who found that schizophrenic patients had emotion
recognition deficits with posed emotional pictures although this
pattern of deficit was not replicated with genuine emotion pic-
tures. Besides the complexity of the emotion recognition deficit,
evidence of impoverished perceptual strategies is now investigated
in schizophrenia. There is a growing body of evidence to suggest
that schizophrenic patients have shortened or abnormal oculomo-
tor scan paths when confronted with faces expressing emotions
(Loughland et al., 2002; Butler et al., 2009), a finding that may be
extended to non-social scenes and reliably discriminate patients
from healthy subjects (Benson et al., 2012, p. 722). These find-
ings highlight the importance of intact perceptual strategies for
an understanding of the affective states of other people. Other
studies have examined the importance of contextual or situational
cues for the perception of emotional and mental states in others.
For instance, it has been shown that contextual information (e.g.,
background scenes or body language) can affect the recognition
of facial emotions (Aviezer et al., 2009). It has been suggested that
the inefficient integration of social contextual information may
limit the ability to infer mental and emotional states from facial
expressions (Green et al., 2007).
Third, schizophrenic patients have also been reported to
have another type of abnormality, relating to attributional style.
According to Penn et al. (2008), attributional style concerns the
explanations people find for positive and negative events (p. 409) –
the way they attribute responsibility, error and merit to others
or to themselves. As an argument for the discriminant validity
of the attributional style construct, a recent work from Mancuso
et al. (2011) showed with a population of 85 schizophrenic outpa-
tients that attributional style measures loaded on a different factor
than social perception and mentalizing, and that this factor corre-
lated selectively with positive symptoms, depression/anxiety, and
agitation.
Finally, metacognition may be conceptualized in its broadest
sense as an individual’s knowledge/representations about his or
her own cognitive processes. As explained by Passerieux et al.
(2012), “When we answer a question or resolve a daily-life sit-
uation, the response is a cognitive product. The estimation of the
quality of this response (confidence in the answer, tendency to use
this answer) is of metacognitive nature.” It is now acknowledged
that schizophrenic patients present impairments of this skill, to
various degrees, which can be assessed by recording ratings of
the degree of confidence immediately after the performance of a
cognitive task. According to Koren et al. (2006), the extent of the
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patients’ knowledge of the disease and their involvement in their
own treatment are positively correlated with metacognitive skills
level. Interestingly, they emphasized a subdivision of the construct
into a monitoring component and a control component, respec-
tively, referring to the self-assessment of the performances of a
cognitive process, and to the effective use of the results of that
process to guide the behavior (for instance, when uncertain, one
might not answer in a free-response paradigm).
This short overview of the constructs of major interest for
schizophrenia research, brings to light the complex, multifaceted
nature of these processes, and consequently of related disorders,
undermining the approach of a monodimensional deficit.
KALEIDOSCOPIC APPROACH OF SOCIAL COGNITION WITH BATTERIES
OF TESTS
With the unabated successful examples of well-known neuropsy-
chological assessment batteries, several researchers advocated the
use of selected sets of social cognitive tests in order to draw a
patient’s panorama of skills. It would be obviously out of the scope
of the present article to discuss the many attempts to validate a
specific set of tests. Of interest is the social cognition psychome-
tric evaluation (SCOPE) initiative from the NIMH, a group of
experts who advocated for the use of a social cognitive battery
based on separate constructs such as attributional style, emotion
processing, ToM, and, eventually, trustworthiness. Nevertheless,
they acknowledged that there was no consensus about the con-
structs to be selected, and a great overlap among both the measures
and the domains (Pinkham et al., 2013). It could be argued that
this overlap constitutes a key feature of social cognitive processes,
which are, by definition, interconnected and mutually informative
(see below for discussion of this point). As noted by Keysers and
Gazzola (2007), “much of the debate in social cognition might
result from choosing tasks that isolate the processes of just one
route in the laboratory. However, it is essential to start designing
tasks that reflect the complexity of social life to test how the social
brain forms an integrated whole.”
There is a considerable experimental evidence to support
the content validity of the aforementioned constructs, but their
additional contribution to the schizophrenic phenotype remains
unclear. First, the relationship of social cognitive disorders with
the patients’ complaints is not straightforward. While some
authors found extremely limited correlations between ToM deficits
and quality of life items (Urbach et al., 2013), other authors
found that this potential link was in statistical interaction with
symptom severity (Maat et al., 2012). Nevertheless, a much
stronger line of evidence emerged during the past years focus-
ing specifically on real-life functioning, outcome, or psychological
handicap. Fett et al. (2011) meta-analyzed 42 schizophrenia stud-
ies and were able to demonstrate a significant correlation of
social cognitive variables with community functioning, which
explained around 16% of the latter variable’s variance. Inter-
estingly, these authors concurred with other experts like those
of the VALERO project (Leifker et al., 2009), and stressed
out the limited consensus about functional outcome constructs
and measures. In addition, they noted that neurocognition and
social cognition leave a large part of the variance in outcome
unexplained.
While causal pathways leading to reduced functioning are
multifactorial, we argue that some intermediate psychological
constructs merit consideration to explain the variance of schizo-
phrenic patients’ outcome. To solve the puzzle, one has to hypoth-
esize that between the impaired processes that are under scrutiny
and negative consequences in real-life situations, some pieces are
still missing. First, we suggest that measurements of social cog-
nition could be obtained by testing the domains of impairments
cited above in an integrative and ecological manner, rather than
separately. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that the tech-
nical limitations of real-life ecological assessments by reminding
Rus-Calafel et al.’s remark: “observing and practicing the patient’s
social skills in natural social interaction/environment could prove
useful [. . .] however [. . .] this can be time-costly for the clinician
and likely highly intimidating for the patient” (p. 82, 2013). We
may add that poor replicability and complex standardization of
these procedures will remain a fundamental limitation in obtain-
ing valid dependent variables. Second, recent theoretical accounts
brought into the light the specificity of interactive situations in
terms of cognitive processes. In the following, we refer to some of
these accounts and argue in favor of their relevance to provide eco-
logically valid insights on some of the putative intermediate links.
PART II
ECOLOGICAL POINTS OF VIEWS ON SOCIAL COGNITION
In the late 1980s, Ickes and coworkers suggested the use of the term
naturalistic social cognition for studies in which the experimen-
tal conditions were socially complex situations (Ickes et al., 1986;
Ickes and Tooke, 1988). Zaki and Ochsner (2009) recently plead
this approach and claimed that, in neuroimaging studies of men-
tal state attribution, researchers ask subjects to make judgments
about targets presented as simple stimuli (pictures, cartoons, or
texts), but these judgments are generally too easy, because the
targets appear to be fictional. They suggested that neuroimaging
studies and experimental psychology studies should generate a
greater variance in terms of social performance, to prevent floor
effects, and should be more ecological and dynamic, more closely
resembling real life.
Besides the importance of naturalistic stimuli for the investiga-
tion of social cognition, the need for overcoming the spectatorial
gap and for adopting a second-person approach has already been
proposed by Schilbach et al. (2013). According to these authors,
the second-person approach is based on interaction and emo-
tional engagement between people, far beyond a mere observa-
tion (p. 395). Thus, constituents of second-person approach are
described by the implication of tasks, which require social interac-
tion and emotional engagements. Reciprocity seems also to be
a key compound of social interaction and there is a growing
literature, which highlights the neurobiological correlates of the
reciprocity in social interaction. Social interactions are, according
to Schilbach (2014), characterized by “reciprocal relations with
the perception of socially relevant information prompting (re-)
actions, which are themselves reacted to”(p. 2). The second-person
approach allows to investigate not only the way that a persons gath-
ers information about the other person but also one’s knowledge
of the other may reside in the interaction dynamics between the
agents (Froese et al., 2014).
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A successful example of this approach has been realized by
Wilms et al. (2010). The authors suggest that the use of gaze con-
tingent stimuli can create a truly interactive paradigm for social
cognitive and affective neuroscience. In this work, participants’
own gaze data have been used to animate a virtual character with
an interactive eye tracking set-up coupled with a MR scanner. Par-
ticipants experienced the effects of their own gaze on the virtual
agent (for instance, in a joint attention condition, avatar may look
to the same object that a subject is looking). This set-up can also
be used to investigate neural correlates of one’s being “initiator”
or being “responder” in a social interaction. According to authors,
the fact that the agent becomes responsive to the participant’s gaze
allows the whole set-up to engage and maintain an “online” social
interaction.
Given the fact that emotion recognition impairments and gaze
abnormalities in social interaction are intricate in psychiatric dis-
orders such as schizophrenia and autism, it should be acknowl-
edged that a second-person approach with naturalistic stimuli
in social cognition settings provide specific information (Tim-
mermans and Schilbach, 2014) at the junction of real-life and
picture-based emotion recognition assessments. For instance, the
experiment proposed by Wilms et al. (2010) is highly relevant to
the case of children with autism. As a matter of fact, children with
autism show less pronounced impairments in their ability to fol-
low someone’s gaze shifts than in their drive to make someone
look at something (Mundy and Newell, 2007).
This is why, according to Zaki and Ochsner, the use of natural-
istic social cognition may be critical to understand illnesses involv-
ing social cognition deficits. Having examined the particular case
of autism spectrum disorders, they concluded,“by moving toward
paradigms that capture the complexity of the real social world, and
assessing perceivers’ abilities to make accurate inferences about
targets, neuroimaging of social cognition can approach more eco-
logically valid theories about how minds understand each other”
(p. 9, 2009). To build upon these theoretical accounts, we identify,
in the following, several characteristics in a naturalistic approach.
First- and second-person perspectives are to be allowed and even
privileged. The mere distant observation of a person as in classi-
cal ToM paradigms (pictures, comic-strips, stories, etc.) might
disengage shared representations (because they are useless to
understand the situation), or neuro-functionally speaking the
mirror neuron system, as well as all the processes that allow the
immersion into a specific social situation.
The subject acts upon the stimuli interactively and is not limited to a
passive stance. Methodologically, it is relevant to raise a distinction
between a true interaction and a fake interaction. In the former,
the reacting subject modifies significantly subsequent stimuli, as
in real life. Adaptative model would be required for instance based
on personality models (Faur et al., 2013) or complex cognitive
architectures (Hemion, 2013). In the latter approach, the subject
is presented controlled stimuli that let him believe and act as if he
could modify the course of the social events. Graph-structured
scenarios with only marginal adaptative capabilities may be used.
While, advances in technologies allow both settings, constraints
on experimental designs and subsequent statistical analyses often
encourage the second solution.
Interaction with complex social agents leads to a certain degree of
unpredictability. It is conceivable that the social brain is shaped to
manage unpredictability although it contributes at making sense
of multiple/successive social cues. The experiment from Yoshida
et al. (2010) brings intriguing evidence of paracingulate cortex
processing uncertainty about another’s agent intentional strat-
egy, i.e., the order of the ToM model used by this agent. Here
again, the reality of the interaction is not crucial to elicit the
illusions of being immersed into an unpredictable situation, and
one might hypothesize that experimental situation with a hidden
level of control on the stimuli are sufficient to elicit these neural
processes.
Multimodal stimuli are present most of the time with a conver-
gence of several channels such as visual perception of social cues
(postures, gestures, emotional displays, etc.), auditory perception
(verbal utterances, prosody), and eventually haptic components.
Notably, the interpretation of the information coming from each
channel requires contextualization, integration, and inferences
and might involve mental state attribution [this is discussed
in Brunet-Gouet et al. (2010)]. As a result, no modality dom-
inates the others and new information has the potential to revise
dramatically the current representation. For instance, an incon-
gruous facial emotion at the end of a lengthy discourse may lead
to a complete revision of our understanding of the verbal content
although the stimulus is quantitatively minimal and qualitatively
poorly informative.
All the inferential processes without exclusion are involved during a
naturalistic interaction, i.e., emotional states inference or empa-
thy, mental state attribution (beliefs, intentions, knowledge, etc.),
moral judgment. In other words, naturalistic paradigms should
not be structured in such away that disengagement of one process
appears relevant to achieve the task.
Contextualization concerns not only multimodal information but
also the succession of events that make sense when associated
within a sequence. While many social cognition paradigms depict
an agent performing actions following a specific schema (inten-
tional comic-strips, unexpected transfer tasks, video-based men-
tal state inferences, etc.), many of them do not capitalize suffi-
ciently on a single character in order to promote a real interest in
this agent. To enter in a true empathetic relationship, it might be
relevant to allow the subject to activate full representation of the
other person, including personality traits.
NEWMETHODS ARE PROVIDED BY RESEARCHES ON VIRTUAL REALITY
The need to investigate social cognition in a more ecological man-
ner will necessitate the use of multimodal, interactive experimental
stimuli and to be as respectful as possible to the criteria cited
above. Advances in computer technology over the last 20 years
made it possible to immerse people in an artificial world and to
allow them to interact with the simulated environment. Virtual
reality is a term commonly used in reference to these technolo-
gies that often require realistic, multimodal feedback. Technically,
virtual reality requires real-time 3D computer graphics, sound,
and other sensory input, and physical models of various degrees
of sophistication, to generate a computer-generated environment
with which the user interacts (Gregg and Tarrier, 2007). In some
cases, haptic, or even olfactory stimuli are proposed [for a review
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of virtual environments and reality and their application in psy-
chopathology (Baus and Bouchard, 2014), presented in the cur-
rent research topic]. Recent technological advances offer excit-
ing opportunities to carry out studies of naturalistic cognition,
through the use of multimodal stimuli and the extension of the
variables measured to physiological and behavioral data. More-
over, the fields of virtual agent simulation and affective computing
have matured and now provide credible solutions for interac-
tivity. For these reasons, Kim et al. (2008) argued that virtual
reality techniques can overcome traditional assessments’ limita-
tions by composing diverse social situations with various back-
grounds and by providing interactive dynamic simulation in social
and emotional situations, in opposition of passive observational
setups.
Despite the absence of consensus on objectives and methods,
psychopathology has also participated to this progress, through
the development of new uses of computer graphics, simulation,
interface technologies, and social agent modeling such as clinical
assessment, intervention, and training. First, new treatments for
psychopathological conditions based on virtual reality may prove
beneficial (Riva,2005). According to Rizzo et al. (2012), clinical vir-
tual reality has significant potential to enhance clinical practice and
research in three key areas: exposure therapy, neuropsychological
assessment, and clinical training with virtual patient agents. Vir-
tual reality settings have been used effectively for the treatment of
post-traumatic stress disorder (Rothbaum et al., 2001; Difede and
Hoffmann, 2002) and social anxiety (Herbelin et al., 2002; Klinger
et al., 2005). These therapies make use of the immersive nature
of virtual environments and their ability to trigger emotions cor-
responding to real-life situations. However, unlike real exposure,
the patients are protected against harmful consequences, helping
them to accept being confronted with anxiogenic stimulation.
Second, cognitive rehabilitation programs using virtual reality
have proved effective for the treatment of patients with unilateral
spatial neglect (Kim et al., 2011) and brain injuries (Christiansen
et al., 1998). Such programs may include cognitive remediation
therapies, during which patients are trained on selected cogni-
tive tasks of increasing processing demand, in order to increase
cognitive efficiency and behavioral performances [for a review,
see Cicerone et al. (2011)]. Based on simple games, computer-
ized cognitive remediation programs are now frequently offered
to patients with psychosis and have been shown to improve cog-
nitive and psychosocial functioning (McGurk et al., 2007b; Wykes
et al., 2011).
However, the use of virtual reality in the treatment of schiz-
ophrenia has been reported only rarely (Ku et al., 2003; Costa
and Carvalho, 2004). Interestingly, the patients participating in
the study by Costa and Carvalho agreed to work with computers
coupled with immersive glasses and demonstrated a high level of
interest in the proposed cognitive tasks. The existence of a spe-
cific motivational effect of virtual reality environments may be
of clinical importance as motivation is a key factor for a success-
ful remediation therapy (Medalia and Richardson, 2005). Among
successful contributions, virtual environments have been used in
attempts to improve the social skills (Rus-Calafel et al., 2013)
or conversational skills and assertiveness (Park et al., 2011) of
schizophrenia patients.
Of importance for the present article, virtual reality can also be
used for the evaluation of cognitive impairments in schizophrenic
patients. For instance, Ku et al. (2003) used a virtual reality system
for the multimodal assessment of cognitive ability in schizophre-
nia patients. In this work, the task consisted of an adaptation of
Wisconsin card sorting test (WCST) to the virtual reality. The pro-
gram projected through a head mount display presented a pyramid
with doors presented like WCST in which schizophrenia patients
had to figure how to get out. The main idea here was to use all
the benefits of a head mount display for visual and auditory stim-
ulus as well as the haptic feedback (vibration signal for wrong
answer). The results showed a correlation of the virtual task and
the classical WCST; however, it provided modest information on
how patients behaved according to the specific modalities of stim-
uli. In the same vein, the results obtained by Freeman et al. (2008)
suggest that virtual reality environments could be used to assess
paranoid thinking in the general population. In this investigation
with 200 healthy subjects, the task consisted of a 4 min journey in a
virtual London underground projected in a head mounted display.
Paranoid thinking as well as other assessments through question-
naires showed significantly that there were a large minority of
participants having paranoid thoughts and that this finding was
correlated with anxiety, worry, perceptual anomalies, and cognitive
inflexibility.
Methodologically speaking, computerized evaluations allow
precise measures of behavior with variables such as performance
rate, and reactions times, which are classically considered in exper-
imental psychology. A recent study with two virtual agents engaged
in a conversation allowed to investigate the gaze patterns of schiz-
ophrenic subjects and demonstrated an increased attention to
the between-agent space when they spoke, putatively, a form of
other’s gaze avoidance (Han et al., 2014). While these authors
recorded the patient’s feelings principally in terms of valence dur-
ing the task, no specific attention was paid to more complex
feelings or interpretations. In the following, we will point out
that naturalistic experiments based on virtual reality offer diver-
sified means to assess the patient’s strategies to process the task,
and to investigate their subjective experiences. Subjective judg-
ments may be recorded both during and after the experiment
with specifically designed questionnaires and provide an insight
into metacognition and interpretation of controlled social stimuli.
Considering the replicability requirements of experimental sci-
ences, we advocate here for the use of such measure to extend our
understanding of the patients’ particularities within interpersonal
interaction.
Lastly, the choice of realistic simulation techniques to gener-
ate social situations and interpersonal interaction raises the issue
of the quality of the empathetic relationship that is established
with the virtual agent. To a certain extent, the occurrence of
empathy may be considered as an extension to the social domain
of the broadly speaking “immersion phenomenon” that is the ulti-
mate ambition of virtual environments. Immersion is classically
defined as the technological power of the system to “deliver an
illusion of reality to the senses of a human participant” (Slater
and Wilbur, 1997). Immersion could be considered as a precursor
leading to a psychological state or even a state of consciousness
characterized by perceiving oneself to be enveloped by, included
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in, and interacting with an environment that provides a contin-
uous stream of stimuli and experiences. As discussed by Witmer
and Singer (1998), the conjunction of immersion with a higher
involvement of the subject (i.e., the “energy” and the attentional
resources allocated to the virtual environment) results in the
subjective experience of presence when the subject privileges the
virtual environment over reality. Interestingly, the latter construct
was investigated with several anxiety-eliciting virtual situations
(TAVE Software) and it was shown that an individual’s anxiety
state as well as his/her personality characteristics like introver-
sion influenced positively the sense of presence (Alsina-Jurnet
and Gutiérrez-Maldonado, 2010). Moreover, factor analyses of
presence self-reports demonstrated the multi-dimensional nature
of this construct, distinguishing spatial presence, involvement,
realness, and predictability and interaction (Schubert et al., 2001).
Interestingly, the concept of social presence was coined to
account for the salience of the relationship with an agent, for
instance, when using communication tools such as videocon-
ference or avatar-based virtual worlds (i.e., Linden lab’s Second
Life) allowing interpersonal interactions, and even extended to
the concept of co-presence, i.e., the sense of being together (Tugba
Bulua, 2012). These different constructs appear to contribute to
the subjects’ satisfactory experience, which in turn could improve
their motivation. Here, we hypothesize that the building of an
empathetic relationship with a virtual agent would constitute a
crucial correlate of the experience of his/her presence. As a conse-
quence for clinical researches focusing on the use of virtual agents
as a particularly motivating technique, studies should combine
assessment of empathy toward the virtual agents, of the subjects’
trait empathetic skills and, more generally of their tendency to
immerse. Last, we advocate a better integration of the constructs
arising from knowledge on the psychological dispositions related
to virtual reality usages, and of those from social neurosciences.
PART III
EXPERIMENTAL ILLUSTRATION OF INVESTIGATING SCHIZOPHRENIA
WITH A VIRTUAL AGENT: THE VIRTUAL CARD GAME PARADIGM
From the many and often heteroclite accounts described above
emerges a relevant new empirical approach for exploring the
interpersonal disturbances of schizophrenia patients in a more
ecological and naturalistic way. This approach focuses on real-time
social interaction, requiring the simultaneous integration of all
social cognition processes: the attribution of intentions to others,
first and second order understanding of mental states, emotion
recognition, empathy, metacognition, attributional style, and the
contextualization of a given social situation. It would not be rea-
sonable to claim that this approach can test all aspects of social
cognition simultaneously. However, this approach makes it possi-
ble to study some of these aspects in interaction, and represents
a more ecological experimental setting than the batteries of social
cognitive tests currently used to assess the impairment of social
cognition in schizophrenic patients. In the following, we will show
how a precise control of stimuli through computer code speci-
fication, allows a simple paradigm to investigate one or several
subcomponents thanks to very simple manipulations of the para-
meters (here, non-verbal communication through emotional dis-
plays with varied valence and intensity). Second, we will illustrate
the subjective aspects of an immersion into an empathetic rela-
tionship through the examination of patients and healthy subjects’
post-experiment reports.
DESCRIPTION OF THE VIRTUAL CARD GAME
The experimental situation was derived from a trust game (i.e.,
games during which one evaluates anothers’ trustworthiness and
intentions in order to produce monetary arbitrages; Berg et al.,
1995) from which psycho-economic judgments were removed.
The participants were presented a game in which they met a
female virtual agent and had to infer from her facial expression dis-
plays which card to choose in order to match the color of another
card (see Figure 1; Supplementary Material). Of methodological
importance, the task is self-explanatory: the agent provides the
instructions to be followed, and, at the middle of the game, addi-
tional informations are provided to help the subject focusing on
emotional displays. However, the participants are not informed
before the experiment of the virtual agent’s communicative inten-
tions. Consequently, the attribution of a cooperative intention is
left entirely to the subjects’ appreciation.
Technically speaking, the task requires only a multimedia per-
sonal computer running the multimodal affective and reactive
characters (MARC) framework (Courgeon et al., 2008; Courgeon
and Martin, 2009) to animate a realistic 3D character named Mary.
MARC is a multicharacter animation platform including real-time
body and facial animations based on the computational model-
ing of emotions (action units models) inspired by the different
FIGURE 1 | Screen captures of the experimental setting, showing the affective agent Mary playing a card game. Left: neutral expression, looking at the
subjects. Middle: positive expression, looking at the right card. Right: negative expression, looking at the right card.
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approaches to emotion in psychology. This platform provides sev-
eral male and female interactive virtual characters, all of which
can speak and simultaneously display subtle facial expressions. In
this experiment, we used the female model called Mary, because
this model was well liked by participants in preliminary tests of
the set-up and had a set of validated emotional expressions (see
Supplementary Material).
A state machine is used to manage the interaction with sub-
jects following a predetermined scenario (Figure 2). A scenario
may be more or less complex and might be seen as an explicit
hardcoding of a behavior to simulate a specific social situation.
The state machine was responsible for determining the agent’s
behavior, i.e., facial expressions to be displayed and verbal state-
ments to be given (if any), as a function of the input provided
by the subjects. In the present example, all the state transitions
were predefined with the exception of the simulation of small
postural movements, blinks, etc. Would the scenario require it,
the state transition could be freed to enforce true interaction as
defined above. However, it is important noting that the subject
was kept blind to the underlying structure of the sequences of
events, so that the system generated a fake interaction, which con-
stitutes an intermediate between a true interaction and a classical
stimulus/response task.
HOW DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF SOCIAL COGNITION ARE MANIPULATED
WITHIN THE VIRTUAL CARD GAME?
As advocated in this article, virtual reality settings based on affec-
tive agents constitute a heuristic approach to the needs of natural-
istic social cognitive research. We have described above a paradigm,
which benefits from real-time 3D rendering of emotions with
possibilities to add verbal communication and more or less degrees
of freedom in the scenario. In the following, we exemplify how
FIGURE 2 | Procedure: description of a single trial.
several constructs that are considered of importance in social cog-
nition research are at least represented and, more importantly, can
be directly manipulated within the present paradigm.
Emotion recognition
Understanding the game and correctly answering requires decod-
ing facial affects, and more precisely, to interpret them as a com-
munication means in the absence of a verbal advice from the agent
to choose one card or the other. Although it is quite unusual in
other paradigms based on affect recognition, the subjects have
to interpret negative emotional displays as helpful cues. Direct
manipulation of the emotional displays is easily made as the soft-
ware platform allows parametric control of action units (valence,
intensity, arousal may be defined). In addition, dependant vari-
ables concerning emotion are obtained during specific trials in
which sympathy ratings on the agent are recorded.
Theory of mind
Understanding the helping intention of the avatar is the most fun-
damental aspect of ToM that is elicited during the game as in any
paradigm based on forms of trust judgments. This judgment of
cooperation might be easily manipulated by changing the strat-
egy of the agent, and also by changing it adaptively during the
game. This would be of major interest to assess patient’s disposi-
tion to manage changing relationships and not to perseverate in
their own strategy. More subtle is the fact that the current ver-
sion of the paradigm makes the agent express the correctness of
the subject’s answers making it possible to interpret these feed-
back as incorrect or misleading (i.e., I believe that Mary is lying
even when she tells me that my choice is correct). According to
a Bayesian framework like in Yoshida et al. (2010) article, such a
simple task could bring some insights on the order of ToM model
that is used by the subject to perform the task.
Metacognition
Measuring metacognitive skills remains technically disputable and
somehow artificial. Like Koren et al. (2004) it is quite straightfor-
ward to implement measures of both monitoring and control.
Self-monitoring could, like in our illustration, be made thanks
to the use of self-reports on a trial per trial basis and with the
correlations with response times, correct answer rates and, even-
tually, behavioral correlates (eye scanpaths, gait changes, skin
conductance, etc.). Metacognitive control could easily and quite
ecologically be implemented by allowing free-choice responses,
i.e., non-response.
To conclude from this non-exhaustive argumentary, it appears
that simple interactive designs contains enough degrees of freedom
to permit simultaneous implementation of several constructs. To
go beyond the present attempt to justify construct validity, psy-
chometric studies should be necessary to ascertain the concurrent
validity of the numerous dependent variables with regards to more
consensual social cognitive tests.
INSIGHTS ON EMPATHETIC RELATIONSHIP WITH A VIRTUAL AGENT
FROM SUBJECTIVE REPORTS
First of all, let’s describe the behavioral patterns found while using
the experimental paradigm. While healthy subjects were success-
ful at interpreting the emotions displayed by the agent as a form
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of communication in order to guide their choices (see behavioral
data in Supplementary Material), schizophrenic patients were pro-
foundly impaired in this task and exhibited very low performance
rates, and increased response time. In our view grounded on the
literature, this result is in perfect accordance with the evidences
showing that schizophrenic patients have profound impairments
in emotion recognition, ToM with slower cognitive processing.
Although the behavioral performance of the patients were low,
it was interesting to explore their subjective reports about their
encounter with the virtual agent. To do so, participants were asked
to complete a short 11-item questionnaire (Table 1). Consider-
ing that the evaluation of the sense of presence would not be
sufficiently informative on intersubjective aspects, we designed
questions focusing specifically on relational empathy and on per-
ception and understanding of the virtual agent’s behavior. Thus,
several important aspects are covered by the questions:
1. The realism of the interaction, with questions directly focusing
on the fact that the subject behaved with the virtual agent as
with a real person (Questions 4–7);
2. The understanding of the behavior and the intentions of the
virtual agent, and the nature the mental state that the subject
attributed to her (Questions 1, 2, 11);
3. An insight on the subject’s own strategy and on his/her
implication (Questions 3, 9);
4. The fact that the subject thought that the virtual agent had an
opinion or a feeling about him. These items are of importance
for that they would signify a bilateral empathetic experience
with a second-person perspective on oneself (Questions 8, 10).
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they
agreed with statements concerning their perception of the agent
on a four-point Likert scale as follows: completely agree (100%),
agree (66.6%), do not really agree (33.3%), and do not agree at
all (0%).
The results of the questionnaires indicated that the patients
welcomed the use of the affective agent and that they were well
motivated for the performance of the task. Their answers were
quite comparable to those of healthy participants. Interestingly,
participants agreed with the opinion that the virtual card game
was realistic and played accordingly. According to Kim et al. (2008),
studies with virtual avatars have shown that patients behave as if
the virtual avatar was a real person standing in front of them and
talking to them. They conclude that an avatar in a virtual envi-
ronment can be used in interaction studies with schizophrenia
patients [see also Ku et al. (2006)].
However, the results presented here draw a more complex pic-
ture and may give some orientations for future developments.
Questions about the mental states of the agent were mitigated
with a tendency to disagree with the fact that the agent took
into account their reactions and that she was helpful. Both the
patients and the healthy subjects observed that the agent could
change her attitude, a fact that is partially true as Mary provides
new instructions at mid-game. Last, but of importance, the lower
agreement rates concerned Mary’s ability to have an opinion on
oneself. This suggests that even if the participants reacted to the
agent’s behavior (question 3), they did not forget that Mary was
Table 1 | Relational empathy questionnaire: mean ratings of
agreement expressed as percentages provided by the two
populations after they had played with the virtual agent.
Question Healthy
subjects
N =15 (%)
Schizophrenic
patients
N =14 (%)
Q1. Mary took into account your answers
with her reactions
36 45
Q2. Mary changed her attitude sometime
in the game
62 64
Q3. You changed strategy during game 68 76
Q4. The game would have been played
the same way if you had been in the
presence of a real person
68 62
Q5. You looked at Mary’s face as if she
was a real person
80 64
Q6. You thought that Mary had her own
personality
53 52
Q7. You had the impression of being in the
presence of someone during the game
40 52
Q8. You wondered what Mary could
possibly think about you
20 29
Q9. You tried to answer correctly in order
to be appreciated by Mary
22 17
Q10. Mary did not have a good opinion
about you
9 21
Q11. Mary wanted you to succeed in this
game
36 44
a computer-animated character. Apparently, both healthy partic-
ipants and patients did not find cues suggesting that the agents
had a representation of the participant’s attitude although they
inferred a quite negative opinion about them in the agent’s atti-
tude. A first means to address this point and to increase the degree
of empathy toward the virtual character consists in making the
agent express opinions about the performance of the participant,
or ask question about the subjects’ feelings. A second strategy is
the introduction of low-level and short-term interaction phenom-
ena. For instance, Timmermans and Schilbach (2014) emphasized
the relevance of gaze contingencies and related abnormalities in
psychopathological conditions such as schizophrenia, autism, and
personality disorders (refer to the article in the present topic). Such
technical improvements are compatible with the present platform
and could, supposedly, improve the sense of presence elicited by
the virtual agent.
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
Advances in virtual reality and affective computing not only bring
exciting perspectives on experimental methods but also challenge
profoundly theories of normal and abnormal social function-
ing. By allowing replicable experimental designs combining mul-
timodality, contextualized stimuli, interactivity with controlled
degrees of unpredictability, as well as intersubjectivity based on
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first- and second-person perspectives, these techniques urge con-
ceptual innovation. In the present article, we have tried to draw
a panorama of some of the emerging concepts that would have
to be considered in the future. We illustrated this approach with
the presentation of a new paradigm and showed how subjective
recording of the patients and healthy subjects experience could
help improving the intersubjective phenomena.
We suggest that virtual reality paradigms with affective agents,
as presented here, constitute a useful and innovative way of assess-
ing social interactions in patients with schizophrenia. These new
techniques could partially overcome the difficulties to predict
impaired real-life social functioning, contributing to improve eco-
logical validity of tests. The use of affective and reactive avatars
can circumvent the limitations of the batteries of test approach
and provide broader information about a patient’s social cogni-
tive skills extending dependent variables to metacognition and
subjective experience measures. Indeed, the paradigm presented
here makes it possible to investigate globally or separately emo-
tion recognition, mental state attribution, and metacognitive
self-evaluation by varying each of these parameters.
As suggested in the experimental illustration, self-reports
obtained before, during, and after the experiment might provide
additional information about the subjective experience. It would
be useful to design and to validate self-report scales to assess
the empathetic relationship with a virtual agent. Knowledge on
human empathy stressing out the importance of cognitive and
affective dimensions could refine the way to measure the com-
ponents of an empathetic experience beyond the measures of
immersion and presence. For that the quality and the vividness
of the virtual experience could affect differentially the patient’s
motivation depending on his/her own psychopathology and per-
sonality, experiments should be conducted to inform designers of
virtual reality remediation therapies on the best means to improve
these aspects.
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